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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EARLE CECIL BARBER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
- vs.FRANK E. MOSS, County Attorney of
Salt Lake County; ALVIN KEDDINGTON, County Clerk of Salt Lake County;
SHARP M. LARSEN, County Treasurer
of Salt Lake County; and DAVID P.
JONES, County Auditor of Salt Lake
County,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 8180

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Brief, Appellant will be referred to as
"plaintiff," and Respondents will be referred to as "defendants,"
All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts, as set out in the Brief of Appellant,
are undisputed. As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the
only question involved in this appeal is whether or not plaintiff
is entitled to witness fees for the entire number of days for
"·hich he was held as a material witness.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
As a matter of simplification and clarification, the points
set out for argument in the Brief of the appellant will be main·
tained herein, and argument submitted under each point as
raised by the appellant.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH, A
PERSON COMMITTED TO JAIL BECAUSE OF INABILITY
TO FURNISH A SURETY BOND IS NOT ENTITLED TO
WITNESS FEES FOR EACH DAY OF CONFINEMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH, A
PERSON COMMITTED TO JAIL BECAUSE OF INABILITY
TO FURNISH A SURETY BOND IS NOT ENTITLED TO
WITNESS FEES FOR EACH DAY OF CONFINEMENT.
Attention of the court is respectfully called to the origin
of payment of witness fees. It is well recognized that from
the very beginning of the common law when any witnesses
were required _!o appear and testify ill a criminal proceeding,
that they were not entitled to compensation as a matter of
right. Every competent citizen was required to appear and
testify in a criminal proceeding. It was a duty imposed by
the common law and there was no provision for payment. It
is only in fairly recent times that statutes have been enacted to
provide for compensation when witnesses are required to testify
in a criminal proceeding.
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A statute covering payment of witness fees now exists in
the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and of course has been in our
statutes for many years. The pertinent applicable statutes are
21-5-2 and 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
These statutes are quoted herein for the information of the
court:

1

, "21-5-2. Witness and jurors fees in criminal casesDaily report of attendance - Every witness in a
criminal case subpoenaed for the state, or for a defendant by order of the state, and every juror, whether
grand or trial, shall, unless temporarily excused, in
person report daily to the clerk his attendance at court
from the time of his appearance to the date of his
discharge, and no per diem shall be allowed for any
day upon which attendanc0 is not so 1·eported."
( Italics ours )
"21-5-4. Witness fees and mileage.- Every witness
legally required or in good faith requested to attend
upon a city or district court or a grand jury is entitled
to $6 per day for each day in attendance and twenty
cents for each mile actually and necessarily traveled
in going only; provided, that in case of a witness's
attending from without the state in a civil case, mileage
for such witness shall be allowed and taxed for the
distance actually and necessarily traveled within the
state in going only."

Special attention is directed to the pertinent Utah statute
21-5-2 which provides that every witness shall, unless tempm··
arily excused, report daily to the clerk his attendance at court.
The latter portion of that statute provides that in order for any
witness to be paid he shall be required to report his attend·
nnce to the clerk for each day that he expected to be paid,
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The court's attention is respectfully called to the case of
Burtenshaw v. Bountiful Irrigation Company, 90 Utah 196,
61 P. 2d 312, in which the court said:
"It is settled in this state that the prevailing party
is entitled to tax as costs the statutory per deim for
witnesses subpoenaed in good faith and actually attending the trial." ( Italics ours )

The court's attention is also respectfully called to the matter of Smith v. Nelson, 23 Utah 512, 65 Pac. 485, wherein this
court said:
"Under our statute, as we construe it, a witness
0
subpoenaed and in actual attendance 0
is entitled
0 0 0
( Italics ours )
to his fees
(/<

The following paragraph is also extracted from the case
of Smith v. Nelson above cited:
"It is further insisted that the court erred in allowing witness fees for witnesses who were at the same·
time in attendance upon court in several other cases
in which the plaintiff was a party. Under our statute
(section 994, Rev. St.) as we construe it, a witness
subpoenaed and in actual attendance in several cases
at the instance of the same plaintiff is entitled to his
fees in each case, although the suits are pending at the
same time and place. Other jurisdictions have ruled
likewise on this subject. 5 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 139; Willink
v. Reckle, 19 Wend. 82; Flores v. Thorn, 8 Tex. 377;
Robison v. Banks, 17 Ga. 211; Vence v. Speir, 18 How.
Prac. 168; Dorrell v. Johnson 17 Pick. 263; McHugh v.
Railway Co., 41 \Vis. 79; Hicks v. Brennan, 10 Abb.
Prac. 304; Eames v. Black, 72 Me. 263."
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Vve must admit that there is some conflict between the
authorities as to whether a witness who is detained in custody
for future appearance may recover witness fees for the entire
period of detention. With respect to cases which have arisen
in connection with this subject, the majority of jurisdictions
hold that there can be no recovery. See 58 American Jurisprudence, Paragraph 885.
The courts hold that statutes authorizing payment of a
wih1ess while attending court did not extend this doctrine to
the time while a witness is forcibly detained awaiting for the
trial to take place, It would appear that this rule would be the
applicable one under our statutes.
First of all, our statute indicates that in order for a witness
to obtain compensation he must report his attendance at court
each day to the clerk of the court. The cases above cited also
indicate that he can be paid only for those days on which he
actually attends court. Based upon the above cases and the
Utah Statute cited, it is the position of the respondents that the
plaintiff is entitled to witness fees for the days that he actually
attended court and reported his attendance to the clerk of the
court. For the remainder of the time that he was detained
awaiting hearing on the matter, it is the position of respondents
that there can be no allowance made for witness fees to the
plaintiff, for the period of time that he was in custody but not
in actual attendance of the court and for days when he did
not report his attendance to the clerk of the court.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this court should affirm
the decision of the District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and dismiss the appeal of the appellant.

Respectfully submitted,
FRANK E. MOSS,
WILLIAM

J.

CAYIAS

Counsel for Respondents
513 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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